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Thought suppression and cognitive vulnerability
to depression
Willem Van der Does*
Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
Objectives. Cognitive reactivity (CR) has been defined as the relative ease with
which maladaptive cognitions or cognitive styles are triggered by mild (non-
pathological) mood fluctuations. CR has been found to predict relapse of depression
(Segal, Gemar & Williams, 1999). This study compared different measures of CR, and
also investigated the role of thought suppression as a possible mechanism underlying
CR.
Design and methods. Participants included 24 previously depressed, and 24 never
depressed individuals who underwent a mood induction. They also completed a
questionnaire designed to measure CR (LEIDS; Van der Does, 2002a), and participated
in the scrambled sentences task (SST). The SST was designed to uncover thought
suppression tendencies, and has been shown to discriminate between never depressed
and previously depressed samples.
Results. LEIDS scores were higher for previously depressed than for never
depressed individuals. However, CR as measured with the mood induction did not
distinguish between these groups. The LEIDS was correlated with the results of the SST
and with self-report measures of thought suppression.
Conclusion. Active suppression of unwanted thoughts may be involved in the
apparent inactive state of depressive cognitions during remission.
According to cognitive theory, individuals at high risk of depression are characterized by
dysfunctional cognitions or schemas. Individuals who endorse statements like, ‘I can
only be happy if everyone likes me’ are thought to be more prone to develop depression
than people who do not. Although recovered depressed patients are at high risk of
future episodes (Mueller et al., 1999), dysfunctional cognitions have proven difficult to
measure in this group. For instance, scores on dysfunctional cognition questionnaires,
for example, the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman, 1979), do not
distinguish between never depressed and previously depressed individuals, only for
currently euthymic individuals (Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & Franklin, 1981;
Simons, Garfield, & Murphy, 1984). Recently, however, a number of measures and
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procedures have been developed that have made cognitive vulnerability to depression
measurable.
Cognitive reactivity as a measure of vulnerability to depression
Firstly, the combination of a particular cognitive style – the tendency to attribute negative
events to internal, global, and stable causes – with negative life events increases the
likelihood of developing a constellation of depressive symptoms called hopelessness
depression (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Alloyetal., 1999; Joiner, 2001). In another
line of investigation, a set of procedures is used that involves the experimental
manipulation of mood. After a so-called sad mood induction, never depressed individuals
and recovered depressed patients typically experience similar changes in mood, but only
the latter group show increases in dysfunctional cognition scores (e.g. Miranda, Gross,
Persons, & Hahn, 1998; Miranda & Persons, 1988; Van der Does, 2002a). Similar findings
have been obtained from studies where cognitions were assessed during naturally
occurring mood fluctuations (Miranda, Persons, & Byers, 1990). Also, individuals at risk of
depression have shown negative information processing biases following a priming
manipulation (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Taylor & Ingram, 1999).
These studies have demonstrated the existence of a residual deficit that has been
labelled cognitive reactivity (CR), but there have also been unsuccessful attempts to
replicate these findings (e.g. Brosse, Craighead, & Craighead, 1999), The importance of
the concept of CR was demonstrated by Segal, Gemar, and Williams (1999), who found
that CR scores for 29 patients treated with antidepressants were greater than that those
for 25 patients treated with cognitive therapy. Furthermore, high CR predicted
depressive relapse, regardless of prior treatment modality.
Measurement of cognitive reactivity
If replicated, these findings may provide clinicians with a tool to assess the need for
(continued) cognitive therapy in patients whose overt symptoms are in remission.
However, mood inductions are rather impractical, and also have a number of fundamental
problems (e.g. a significant minority of participants do not experience a mood change).
Therefore, alternative procedures have been developed. Teasdale and Cox (2001) found
differences between previously depressed and never depressed individuals on a new self-
report measure, the Depressed States Checklist. Furthermore, preliminary data suggest
that another brief self-report measure, the Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity (LEIDS)
also distinguishes between previously depressed and never depressed groups, and also
correlates highly with CR, as measured with a mood induction procedure (Van der Does,
2002a). A limitation of this latter study, however, is that only 8 of the 48 participants were
vulnerable to depression (i.e. had experienced a depressive episode in the past). Since CR
is higher in formerly depressed individuals, the performance of the LEIDS may not have
been optimally tested. The aims of the present study were (a) to further investigate the
LEIDS as a measure of CR in a more diverse sample, and (b) to compare CR scores to other
measures of cognitive vulnerability to depression.
Thought suppression and depression
The concept of CR is based on Bower’s (1987) associative network theory. During
remission, depressive cognitions may not disappear, but become inactive (‘dormant’ or
‘latent’) (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Miranda & Persons, 1988; Teasdale, 1988).
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Cognitive theory has clear ideas about how dysfunctional schemas develop (Segal,
Williams, Teasdale, & Gemar, 1996), but it is less clear about how an existing
dysfunctional schema becomes latent. It has been argued that depression-related
cognitions may not become inactive, but are actively suppressed ( Wenzlaff & Bates,
1998). In this view, remission of depression equals regaining mental control over
negative cognitions. Indeed, in the early stages of cognitive therapy, patients are taught
to distract themselves from negative thinking patterns. According to ironic process
theory ( Wegner, 1994), mental control is more likely to fail when mental capacity is
taxed. In other words, under conditions of mental load, the effortful process of
suppressing depressive cognitions is hindered, and negative cognitions are more likely
to become active and conscious. To test this hypothesis, depressed, not depressed, and
previously depressed individuals completed a task that required unscrambling
sentences that could form either positive or negative statements ( Wenzlaff & Bates,
1998). The task was taken under time pressure, and half of the participants were also
given a six-digit number to remember during the test (‘cognitive load condition’). When
participants are explicitly instructed to form positive sentences, the production of a
negative sentence is thought to reflect a failure of mental control. As predicted by ironic
process theory, previously depressed individuals in the cognitive load condition formed
a higher percentage of negative statements (17%) than those in the no-load condition
(5%). For the currently depressed and the never depressed groups, cognitive load did
not affect the percentage of negative statements. Furthermore, the percentage of
negative statements unscrambled was correlated with self-reported thought suppres-
sion frequency in the at-risk group.
The second aim of the present study was to replicate Wenzlaff and Bates’ (1998)
findings, and to investigate the relationship of thought suppression with CR.
Hypothesizing that thought suppression is indeed involved in the ‘inactive’ state of
depressive cognitions, it was predicted that both measures would be correlated.
In summary, the following hypotheses were tested:
(1) LEIDS scores correlate significantly with DAS change scores before and after the
induction of a sad mood.
(2) Thought suppression (measured by self-report and by the scrambled sentences
task) is higher in previously depressed than in never depressed individuals.
(3) Cognitive reactivity (measured by the LEIDS and by DAS change scores) and
thought suppression are correlated, even when residual symptoms of depression
are partialled out.
Methods
Participants
Previously depressed and never depressed participants were recruited through
advertisements at the faculty of Social Sciences of Leiden University, the university
library, and at a number of sites in the town of Leiden, for example, the town library.
Inclusion criteria were being between the ages of 18 and 70 years, and fluency in Dutch.
Participants were allocated to one of the study groups on the basis of presence or
absence of an episode of major depression in the past. Recruitment continued until both
groups had 24 participants. For both groups, an exclusion criterion was a current
episode of depression or dysthymia according to DSM-IV (American Psychiatric
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Association, 1994). Past dysthymia was an exclusion criterion for the never depressed
group. The experiment took approximately 70 minutes and participants were paid e 6.
Mood induction
Participants were asked to try to focus on a time or event in their lives when they felt sad
(or to envision a future sad event) while sad music was played on audiotape (cf. Segal
et al., 1999). The music was presented as an auxiliary, not as something that would by
itself always produce a sad mood.
Scrambled sentences task (SST)
A Dutch translation of the test constructed by Wenzlaff and Bates (1998) was used: three
sets of 20 scrambled sentences were presented in counterbalanced order. Each of the
scrambled sentences contained six words. A uniform set of instructions preceded the
first set. Participants had to unscramble precisely five words in each sentence by placing
a number over each of the five words indicating the proper order. For example:
Participants were instructed to choose only one of the possible solutions, to work
quickly, and not to correct mistakes. Each set of 20 scrambled sentences was preceded
by one of three valence instructions, presented in counterbalanced order: (a) no valence
instructions (‘Unscramble each sentence to form whatever statement comes to mind
first’), (b) negative valence instructions (‘Unscramble each sentence to form a negative
statement – one that conveys a negative thought or idea’), and (c) positive valence
instructions.
Immediately prior to the presentation of each set of scrambled sentences, half of the
participants (randomly determined) were asked to retain a six-digit number in memory
(the cognitive load condition). Following each set of 20 sentences, participants
attempted to recall the six-digit number and were given a new six-digit number prior to
the next set. The maximum time to complete each set was 4 minutes.
Following Wenzlaff and Bates (1998), on completion of the three sets of 20
sentences, participants rated how often they had tried to suppress unwanted negative
thoughts during the past month, and how successful they had been at suppressing these
thoughts. Both ratings were made on a 7-point Likert scale.
Instruments
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams,
1995).
The current and past depression modules of the SCID were administered to check the
inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Van der Does &
Beck, 2005).
This 21-item measure assesses current (past 2 weeks) levels of depressive symptoms.
The mean scores of the BDI-II are 1 point (lower score range) to 6 points (higher score
range) higher than those of the BDI-I (Beck et al., 1996). The Dutch translation was used
(Van der Does, 2002c).
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Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS) – versions A and B (Weissman, 1979)
The DAS measures dysfunctional beliefs that, according to cognitive theories, are core
concepts of vulnerability to depression. As noted in the introduction, CR is the change
in DAS scores before and after a mood induction procedure (Segal et al., 1999). Forms
A and B of the DAS were used. Both forms have 40 items.
Mood ratings
Participants gave three ratings of their current mood (sadness, irritation, tension)
repeatedly throughout the experiment, using Likert-type rating scales, ranging from not
at all (0) to extremely (10).
Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity (LEIDS; Van der Does, 2002a)
The LEIDS is a self-report measure of CR to sad mood. Participants are asked to imagine
feeling somewhat sad (but not depressed), and then to fill out 26 items that comprise
four subscales. Sample items for each of these subscales are: ‘When I am in a sad mood,
I have less confidence in my future’ (negative self-evaluation; NSE); ‘I work harder when
I feel down’ (acceptance/coping; A/C); ‘When I am sad, I care less about what others
think of me’ (indifference; IND); ‘When I feel down, I take fewer risks’ (harm avoidance;
HAV). The scale was developed in a sample of 198 participants; it was found to have
good psychometric properties, and to correlate highly with CR, as measured with a
mood induction procedure (Van der Does, 2002b).
White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994)
The WBSI is a 15-item scale to measure stable individual differences in the tendency to
suppress thoughts across a variety of situations and thought topics. Like the original, the
Dutch version is unifactorial and is reliable in terms of internal consistency and test–
retest reliability (Muris, Merckelbach, & Horselenberg, 1996).
Procedure
Participants received written information about the study by mail or e-mail. All
participants were tested in a single session that lasted between 60 and 70 minutes. After
an opportunity for questions was given and informed consent was obtained,
participants were interviewed by a trained experimenter using the SCID modules.
Next, they filled out the BDI-II, WBSI, and LEIDS. Participants underwent the mood
induction and then completed the SST, in fixed order. These procedures were separated
by a 5-minute break and by a 10-minute neutral task (memory test for abstract figures),
to counter crossover of residual mood effects. The mood induction was preceded and
followed by the DAS and the three mood ratings. To counter any systematic differences
between the two DAS versions, half of the participants received form A before, and form
B after, the mood induction. The order was reversed in the other half of participants.
The two DAS form orders, the two conditions of the SST (load/no load), and the six
orders of presentation of the three SST sets (valence order) were stratified to form cells
with equal numbers of participants. Participants were randomly allocated to one of
the cells. After the SST, participants were paid and debriefed. A brief humorous
movie fragment was available to lift any residual mood effects, but it was not necessary
to use it.
An experimenter was present in the test room, except during the mood induction
procedure, when participants were left alone. As known to the participants, the
experimenter went to an adjacent room and followed the procedure via one-way
screen and intercom. Participants were signalled through the intercom after 7 minutes
to begin filling out the mood ratings and DAS. The music continued while the
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participants filled out the questionnaires, and the experimenter returned when the
questionnaires were completed.
Results
Participants
Fifty participants were recruited. Two participants were excluded after the SCID-
interview because they fulfilled criteria for a current depressive episode. Forty-eight
participants completed the experiment, but the SST results of two participants had to be
excluded: one had clearly misread the valence instructions to one set of sentences, and
another participant had completed very few sentences because she had been copying
the words in a new order instead of putting numbers above the words. These
individuals’ mood induction results were retained. In another seven cases, the
experimenter failed to notice that the participant had overlooked the final page of the
booklet that contained the questionnaires. For these participants, the frequency and
success of thought suppression ratings were missing, but their other results were
retained. There were no adverse events.
Demographic and baseline clinical characteristics are shown in Table 1. About half of
the participants in each group were college students. The ages ranged from 19 to 56
years, and 50% were older than 21. The current level of depressive symptoms (BDI-II
score) was low and equivalent for both groups. In the previously depressed group,
participants had fulfilled a mean number of 6.9 (SD ¼ 1:4) of the nine DSM-IV criteria for
a major depression during their worst episode. Two participants in the never depressed
group had experienced a subclinical episode of depression in the past (three and four
symptoms, respectively), but not dysthymia. As expected, both groups had similar DAS
scores. LEIDS scores as well as WBSI scores, however, distinguished between never
depressed and previously depressed groups. For both scales, the between-group
difference was approximately one standard deviation (except for the acceptance/
coping subscale of the LEIDS).
Table 1. Demographic and clinical baseline scores for never depressed (N ¼ 24) and previously
depressed (N ¼ 24) participants
Never depressed Previously depressed Contrast
Age 25.3 (8.5) 27.5 (11.1) ns
Sex (% females) 66.7% 75.0% ns
Depressive symptoms (BDI-II) 3.8 (3.7) 4.7 (5.2) ns
Dysfunctional cognitions (DAS) 110.1 (18.7) 108.9 (24.9) ns
Thought suppression (WBSI) 37.3 (9.9) 46.3 (11.4) p ¼ :006
LEIDS: negative self-evaluation 9.7 (6.3) 14.9 (6.8) p ¼ :008
LEIDS: acceptance/coping 1.3 (1.6) 2.1 (3.1) ns
LEIDS: indifference 7.7 (3.8) 11.0 (5.4) p ¼ :020
LEIDS: harm avoidance 5.8 (4.1) 8.4 (4.6) p ¼ :039
LEIDS: total score 24.4 (12.4) 36.4 (15.0) p ¼ :018
Notes. Mean scores, standard deviations in parentheses. Contrast: t-test (or x2), two-tailed significance.
BDI-II ¼ Beck Depression Inventory – II, WBSI ¼ White Bear Suppression Inventory, DAS ¼
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, LEIDS ¼ Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity.
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Mood induction
It was expected that the mood induction procedure would lead to comparable changes
in sad mood in both groups. Smaller changes were expected for tension and irritability.
Furthermore, it was expected that cognitive changes would only appear in the
previously depressed group. A 2 £ 2 £ 3 (time £ group £ mood rating) general linear
model showed significant, or nearly significant, main effects of time, Fð1; 46Þ ¼ 44:5;
p , :001; mood, Fð1; 46Þ ¼ 3:7; p ¼ :062; and group (past depression), Fð1; 46Þ ¼ 5:4;
p ¼ :024; and significant interactions of time by mood, Fð1; 46Þ ¼ 38:2; p , :001; and
time by past depression, Fð1;246Þ ¼ 5:4; p ¼ :025. This analysis was followed by
separate 2 £ 2 (time £ group) general linear models for each of the three mood
ratings, and for DAS scores. These analyses showed that the mood induction had a
significant effect on all three mood ratings and on cognitions (all main effects of time
were significant). The largest effect was on sadness (see Table 2). However, the
interaction with group was only significant for irritability. In other words, the previously
depressed group had a larger increase in irritability scores than the never depressed
group, but not a larger increase in sadness, tension, and dysfunctional cognitions.
In other words, the expected between-group difference in CR (as measured by DAS
change scores) was not observed. As noted above, CR as measured by the LEIDS was
higher in the previously depressed group, as were WBSI scores. The correlations of the
DAS change score with the WBSI and the LEIDS total and subscale scores were low and
non-significant.
Scrambled sentences task
The percentage of negative statements was analysed with a 2 £ 2 £ 3 general linear
model, with depression history and cognitive load as between-subjects variables, and
valence instructions as within-subject variable. This yielded a significant main effect for
valence instructions, Fð1; 42Þ ¼ 6:8; p ¼ :013, and a nearly significant effect for
cognitive load Fð1; 42Þ ¼ 3:5; p ¼ :069, but not for depression history, Fð1; 42Þ ¼ 0:03;
ns. The only significant interaction was between depression history and cognitive load:
Fð1; 42Þ ¼ 5:2; p ¼ :028. Table 3 shows that previously depressed individuals produced
a higher percentage of negative sentences under cognitive load (in all three conditions),
whereas cognitive load did not affect the performance of never depressed individuals.
The three-way interaction was not significant, nor was the interaction of valence and
load in the previously depressed sample.
Grammatical errors
A number of participants made one or more errors in the SST. Rarely, an incorrect
sentence was produced, and somewhat more frequently, a 4- or 6-word sentence was
produced. The analyses were repeated with the errors included (as long as a positive or
negative meaning of the sentence was clear). The pattern of results as shown in Table 3
was identical in these analyses.
Relationship among measures of cognitive vulnerability
LEIDS scores, but not DAS change scores, correlated significantly with the percentage of
negative sentences in the SST. Thought suppression was also correlated with the SST
(see Table 4). Table 5 shows that LEIDS scores, but not DAS change scores, were
significantly associated with frequency of thought suppression. NSE and HAV were
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inversely related with success of thought suppression. These patterns were identical for
previously depressed and never depressed groups (not shown).
Discussion
Participants who had been depressed in the past did not show larger mean CR scores
(DAS change scores) than never depressed participants. Based on previous research, this
finding was unexpected (Miranda & Persons, 1988; Miranda et al., 1998; Van der Does,
2002a), but not unprecedented (Brosse et al., 1999). Other studies using slightly
different designs or mood induction procedures also failed to find differences in
dysfunctional attitudes after priming between never depressed and previously
depressed individuals (Dykman, 1997; Solomon, Haaga, Brody, & Kirk, 1998).
Apparently, either the cognitive effects of mood inductions depend on unknown
Table 3. Mean percentage of negative statements unscrambled by condition
Previously depressed (N ¼ 22) Never depressed (N ¼ 24)
Load No load Load No load
Valence instructions
Positive 9.8 (18.6) 0.5 (1.6) 1.7 (3.3) 1.0 (2.3)
Negative 94.9 (9.6) 90.1 (18.7) 97.6 (3.8) 96.8 (6.3)
None 11.0 (13.4) 7.1 (7.6) 5.8 (7.6) 9.1 (11.3)
Mean 38.5 32.6 35.0 35.6
Table 4. Correlations of suppression and cognitive reactivity with percentage of negative statements
under load (N ¼ 24) and no load (N ¼ 22) conditions
Cognitive load
No load Load
Thought suppression
WBSI total score 2 .12 .56**
Frequency rating 2 .24 .10
Success rating .49* 2 .21
Cognitive dysfunction
DAS before mood induction .04 .20
DAS after mood induction 2 .12 .22
Cognitive reactivity
DAS change score 2 .17 .06
LEIDS: negative self-evaluation 2 .26 .48*
LEIDS: acceptance/coping .06 .16
LEIDS: indifference 2 .20 .47*
LEIDS: harm avoidance 2 .09 .34
LEIDS: total score 2 .19 .52**
Notes. *p , :05, **p , :01.
WBSI ¼ White Bear Suppression Inventory, DAS ¼ Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, LEIDS ¼ Leiden
Index of Depression Sensitivity.
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procedural differences, or these effects are sometimes obscured by an instrument that is
not reliable enough. There are a number of reasons to believe that the problem lies with
the instrument, not with procedures. Firstly, in the present study, the same procedures
were used as in an earlier study in which DAS change scores were higher in previously
depressed participants (Van der Does, 2002a). Secondly, the DAS has a number of
known problems. It has 40 items, and the score range is 0–240. Typically, the mean
score lies around 110 (with a SD of around 20), and even previously depressed
participants’ scores increase only slightly after mood induction (less than 10 points).
Furthermore, a 40-item scale seems too long for this particular purpose; the length of
the questionnaire may contribute to diluting the effects of the mood inductions. Finally,
to avoid repetition of the same 40 items within a 7-minute time frame, two parallel forms
of the DAS are often used. There are serious doubts about whether these forms are
actually interchangeable (Power et al., 1994; Segal et al., 1999). LEIDS scores, however,
did show the theoretically expected differences between previously depressed and
never depressed groups.
Thought suppression, as measured with the WBSI, also distinguished between
individuals with, and without, a history of depression. Probably, the observed group
differences in the present study are not specific to depression, because high WBSI
scores are associated with many dimensions of psychopathology, particularly with
obsessions, depression, and anxiety (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994; Muris et al., 1996).
In symptomatic patients, WBSI scores did not differentiate among patients with a mood
disorder, an anxiety disorder, or psychosocial problems ( V-code diagnosis), (Spinhoven
& Van der Does, 1999).
The previously depressed group also exhibited the failure of mental control on the
scrambled sentences task, which was first demonstrated by Wenzlaff and Bates (1998).
Under conditions of cognitive load, these participants unscrambled a higher number of
negative sentences. As argued by Wenzlaff and Bates, the combination of time pressure
and cognitive load in this task may undermine efforts to keep negative thoughts from
entering awareness. In the present study, the size of the effect was a little bit smaller
than in Wenzlaff and Bates; difference between load and no-load conditions: 12% vs.
Table 5. Correlations of thought suppression and cognitive reactivity, corrected for depressive
symptoms
Thought suppression
WBSI total (N ¼ 48Þ Frequency (N ¼ 39Þ Success (N ¼ 39)
Cognitive reactivity
DAS change score 0.01 0.06 20.05
LEIDS: negative self-evaluation 0.56*** 0.25* 20.40*
LEIDS: acceptance/coping 0.24 0.11 20.07
LEIDS: indifference 0.56*** 0.37* 0.03
LEIDS: harm avoidance 0.47*** 0.39* 20.37*
LEIDS: total score 0.66*** 0.39* 20.31
Notes. Partial correlations, BDI-II scores partialled out.
Two-tailed significance: *p , :05, **p , :01, ***p , :001.
WBSI ¼ white bear suppression inventory, DAS ¼ dysfunctional attitudes scale, LEIDS ¼ Leiden index
of depression sensitivity.
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9%), and in contrast with Wenzlaff and Bates, the effect did not correlate with
frequency of thought suppression, as measured with a single rating immediately after
the task. The effect did correlate, however, with WBSI scores, which is probably a
more psychometrically sound measure of thought suppression than a single rating. The
present findings also differ from Wenzlaff and Bates’ in that the cognitive load
increased the percentage of negative sentences overall, whereas in Wenzlaff and Bates,
the effect appeared with positive and neutral valence instructions, but not with
negative valence instructions.
Thought suppression and the SST results also showed rather strong correlations with
LEIDS scores. The intercorrelations among these different measures of cognitive
vulnerability to depression provide indirect support for the position that during
remission of a depressive episode, depressive cognitions do not become inactive
(or dormant/latent), but rather are actively suppressed. In other words, thought
suppression may be one of the mechanisms by which mental control is gained over
depressive cognitions. This is, however, a short-term solution that may well exacerbate
future problems. Thought suppression may work relatively well for a period of time, but
under conditions of increased stress, when cognitive capacity is reduced, the
mechanism may backfire. Ironic process theory (Wegner, 1994) predicts that thought
suppression paradoxically intensifies unwanted thoughts. Under normal conditions, a
monitoring system for negative thoughts works in the background of consciousness,
serving to renew or intensify distraction efforts. However, when mental control is taxed
and begins to falter, the vigilance system intrudes on awareness and makes unwanted
thoughts more accessible than they would have been if mental control had never been
attempted (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998).
In this respect, there are a number of promising recent developments. Firstly,
cognitive therapy seems to exert a more positive effect on CR than pharmacotherapy,
thereby reducing vulnerability to future depressive episodes (Segal et al., 1999).
Secondly, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) has been shown to further
reduce relapse rates, particularly in highly vulnerable patients (Teasdale et al., 2000).
MBCT is a group intervention designed to train recovered patients to disengage from
dysphoria-activated depressogenic thinking (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). The
goal of mindfulness meditation is to be aware of, and open to, what is happening in all
domains of experience in the moment, and to be able to shift attention. For instance, if
one is focusing on one’s own breathing, and attention wanders to negative thoughts and
feelings, these are ‘acknowledged and accepted’, after which attention is re-directed to
breathing (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Segal et al., 2002). Since this is probably repeated often
during a mindfulness session, exposure to negative thoughts might be involved in the
mechanism of action of MBCT. In other words, patients are actually taught the opposite
of thought suppression.
The present study has a number of limitations. Firstly, the presence of emotional
disorders other than depression and dysthymia was not assessed. Therefore, the
presence of other emotional disorders could potentially account for the findings.
However, we do not think this is very likely. If a sizable number of participants in the
recovered group suffered from an anxiety disorder, for instance, then the BDI-II score
of this group would have been substantially higher. A second limitation is that there was
no other recovered-psychiatric control group, which makes it impossible to determine
whether the LEIDS and the SST results are specific to depression, or a general
vulnerability factor. As noted above, the WBSI is not specific to depression. Including a
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psychiatric control group would be quite important for future studies on CR, since this
has rarely been done.
In conclusion, the present study has provided further evidence that the LEIDS is a
measure of cognitive vulnerability to depression, and that the scrambled sentences task
also taps an aspect of cognitive vulnerability to depression. Because the mood
induction experiment did not yield the expected results, it could not be confirmed that
the LEIDS is a measure of CR. Interesting areas for future research involve the
relationships, and possible overlap, with other measures of cognitive vulnerability,
including the recently developed Depressed States Checklist (Teasdale & Cox, 2001),
cognitive style (Alloy et al., 1999), and rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Finally, an
unexplored territory is the relationship of cognitive vulnerability with biological
vulnerability indices, for example, hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis
disturbance (Holsboer, 2001), or response to tryptophan depletion challenge (Moreno,
Heninger, McGahuey, & Delgado, 2000; Van der Does, 2001). Providing that future
studies confirm that the LEIDS measures CR, the significant correlations among the
LEIDS, the SST and WBSI suggest a mechanism through which depressive cognitions
become inactive.
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